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Abstract 
When a state claims its practices are lawful but at the same time another claims this unlawful, a paradox 
emerges. Legal indeterminacy becomes the ordinary rule, while the resolution of disputes is designated the 
exception. To illustrate how international law deals with paradoxes, this paper will employ the dichotomy of 
upstream–downstream trans-boundary interstate relations. Here the paradox arises, since upstream states 
traditionally advocate for the free utilisation o f  water within their territory, while downstream states 
instead advocate for the waters full continued flow. Although, from a logical perspective, such a paradox 
would typically be viewed as something negative, from a social perspective, paradoxes also draw 
attention to the frames of common sense. Indeed, by employing a Luhmannian-inspired theoretical 
framework, this paper proposes that, through a sociological understanding of paradoxes, one can more 
adequately rediscover and reconceptualise the manner in which international  law institutionalises 
conflicting expectations into a more harmless, bounded and permitted contradiction. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
When the conditions of possibility are at the same time the conditions of impossibility, a paradox 
emerges. When a  state claims its practices are lawful but at the  same time  another  claims this 
unlawful, a paradox also emerges. To illustrate how paradoxes are dealt with by the international 
law system (ILS), this paper will employ the dichotomy of upstream–downstream trans-boundary 
interstate relations. Here, the paradox arises because the upstream  state traditionally  advocates for a  
position  based  upon  ‘absolute  territorial   sovereignty’,  which  involves  freely  utilising  water 
within its territory, while the downstream state traditionally  counters with ‘absolute territorial 
integrity’,  whereby  the  continuation of the  full flow of waters  is instead  advocated.1  Although, 
from a logical perspective, such a paradox would typically be viewed as something  negative, from a 
social perspective, paradoxes also draw attention to the frames of common  sense. Indeed, this 
paper proposes that, by employing a sociological understanding of paradoxes, one can more adequately 
rediscover and reconceptualise the manner in which international law institutionalises conflicting 
expectations into a more harmless, bounded and permitted  contradiction. 
In order to reconstruct these legal operations,  this  paper  therefore  proposes  a Luhmannian- 
inspired process-based theoretical framework. The purpose here is not to prescribe the optimal 
formulations regard ing  how standards should be designed and operated, nor is it to reconstruct a 
workable model for predicting the outcome of new putative norms of customary law, as D’Amato 
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visualised in the ILS (2005; 2014). Rather, the ambition here is to reconceptualise how international 
law works in operational terms, and to explore what forms of legal communications are triggered, 
when one tries to make paradoxes invisible. Significantly, ‘operational’ here is understood not as a 
question of what is valid law and its passive unending final answers, but rather the more actively 
variant question of how the ILS proceeds in determining  law’s validity. Comprising four sections, 
this paper  begins  with  a brief résumé  of international law  reconceptualised  as an  autopoietic 
system  (Section  II), followed  by  the  main  body, the  theoretical  framework  (Section  III), with 
conclusions reached in the last section. 
 
 
 
II. International law as an autopoietic system 
 
International law is a system; its  environment  is the  field  of political  international relations. 
Although the term ‘system’ is often used to describe law as a system of norms, this paper employs a 
very different  understanding;  it refers here  to a particular  autopoietic  self-reproducing  system that  
constitutes   itself  by  distinguishing  what  it  does,  from  what  occurs  in  its  environment. Consider 
an anthill, which Bergthaller (2014) uses to describe an autopoietic system. The low probability of 
an individual ant to determine  the shortest path between a food source and its nest becomes a higher  
probability  if we observe the  more  complex system of foraging ants: we find 
‘ants laying trails following trails laid by other ants, who laid these trails following the trails laid 
by other ants  .  . and so forth’ (Bergthaller, 2014, p.  42). In systemic terminology, the system of 
foraging ants is able to autopoietically  reproduce  because of its remarkable  ability to assert itself 
against  its environment (namely  everything  else surrounding  the  system, such  as predators  or 
physical obstacles). Indeed, this is achieved by the system developing substantial  autonomy  from 
its environment – that is, by the swarm of foraging ants laying a highly reductive chemical code 
that  circumscribes  the domain  of differences in the environment that  is relevant  to it (e.g. food/ 
not-food). 
This line of thinking is also similar to that of the international legal system reconceptualised as an 
autopoietic system. Since, just like an anthill, which self-organises itself through the recursive 
processing of pheromone   trails,  the  self-organisation  of the  ILS occurs  through   the  recursive 
processing of communicative filters. For heuristic purposes, we may conceptualise this as the 
employment of  a contingency  formula, namely a binary code of justice/non-justice  that equips the 
ILS ‘with controlled dynamics in order to keep itself apart from its environment’ (Luhmann, 2004, p. 
129). After all, if the ILS were unable to differentiate itself from the ongoing  power games of 
political  actors or the  profit-oriented  calculations  of lobbyists, then  the  ILS would, as a system, 
likely  fall  apart.  Indeed, i t  i s   precisely  because  the  ILS is  able  to  reduce  complexity  in  an 
environment of high complexity that helps to explain how and why operators of the law, such as a 
jurist or practitioner,  do what they do. Why is this? 
The answer can be found in the analytical power of reconceptualising the ILS as an autopoietic 
self-distinguishing system that sets out to describe the social filters through which our perceptions of 
‘legal communications’2   are constructed.  This is because,  contrary  to  Fischer’s  and  Teubner’s 
introduction of the co n cept  o f  ‘auto-constitutional  regimes’3   that  tends  to  deny  the  ‘unity  of 
 
 
2 Meaning here all communications in society that are understood as directly relating to issues of legality or 
illegality.  This could be, for example, government d ep a rtment s   debating  the creation  of new laws to the 
teaching and interpretation of legal norms in law schools, or to environmental non-governmental 
organisations  (NGOs) investigating  cases of trans-boundary  water pollution  with a view to possible court 
action. 
 
3 This being the  argument  that  new  structures  of law have  emerged  departing  from  state-oriented  legal 
management;  see Fischer-Lescano and Teubner (2004). 
  
 
 
 
international law’,4 an autopoietic reconceptualisation of the ILS has the advantage of rediscovering 
the system’s inner phenomenal structures – a precondition for locating the reoccurring  observable 
patterns  of law’s argumentative practices. Consider a lawyer advising a state on the development 
of its trans-boundary w a t e r s . For heuristic purposes, we may say that such communications form 
part of the periphery  of the ILS because it constitutes  a zone of non-compulsory  decision-making 
open to all kinds of legal/non-legal interests. By contrast, the centre, namely the courts, we may 
conceptualise   as  the  ILS’s  autonomous   operations   because  it  is  only  here  whereby   ruling 
obligations are rooted in the ILS itself. In this sense, if the lawyer were to offer meaningful legal 
advice to the state, then  the lawyer must  respect the possibility  of arriving  at a decision in the 
court – the place where law’s unique prestation5 can be found. Of course, this does not mean non- 
legal communications produced  at the ILS’s periphery  are to be ignored altogether,  for it is also 
necessary  that  the  ILS remains   a  dynamic   system,  as  exemplified  when   legal  professionals 
constantly  reinterpret  interstate  treaty norms  that  then  generate a flow of communications back 
towards courts. Indeed, it is precisely this dynamic ‘circular relationship of influence’  (Luhmann, 
2004, pp. 278, 289) between  the law’s periphery  and centre that  D’Amato had in mind  when  he 
devised the  four  conceptual  filters  –  the  self-preservation,  equitable,  reciprocity  and 
interdependence filters – as the autopoietic  operations  of the ILS. This, he argued, is heuristically 
useful for working out how legal claims might eventually be filtered through the mind of a judge, 
namely the ILS’s operations at the centre (D’Amato, 2005). 
Nonetheless, although the proposed theoretical framework structurally  derives from D’Amato’s 
model of the  ILS, the  methodological  approaches  differ significantly.  This is because, whereas 
D’Amato’s model aligns itself more to a normative  account of law, the proposed framework offers a 
strictly descriptive account, the former being an attempt  to ‘help litigators and negotiators make 
their international-law arguments  sounder and more persuasive’ (D’Amato, 2014, p. 650), whereas 
the latter restricts itself to a description  ‘to understand  legal communications as a part of society 
in operation’  (Luhmann,  2004,  p. vii). The analytical  value here of the descriptive approach  that 
aspires to reconceptualise  international law as an  autopoietic  self-distinguishing  system is that, 
while it cannot offer practical technical guidance, it can provide a ‘semantic reorganization  of 
knowledge’ (Luhmann, 2008, p. 20) so as to reach a proper formulation  of how to work with 
indeterminacy in  law. That is more  specifically  the  indeterminacy problem  of how  to  steer  a 
course   between   the   Scylla  of  Sisyphean   meaninglessness   and   the   Charybdis   of  cynical 
decisionism, between Koskenniemi’s Utopianism  and Apologism.6 But why adopt sociological 
description  as the fruitful antidote? 
This is because a descriptive approach employs a strictly ‘scientific’7 system–environment 
relational analysis  that  aspires to begin with  certainty  in its object of study. After all, whereas a 
normative approach  has the tendency  to purge itself8  by employing  the formula of ‘in spite of X, 
we think Y ’, a descriptive approach  surpasses personal  experiences  and habits  by employing  the 
 
 
4 As suggested by Kessler and Kratochwill; see Kessler and Kratochwill (2013, p. 170). 
5 Prestation means Leistung in German, which translates as performance or contribution. 
6 This being Koskenniemmi’s critique  that  abstract  normativity  leads to utopian  arguments  irrelevant  to 
contemporary  practices, and  that  law via sovereignty  reducible  to the  will of states leads to a position 
whereby  law  ends  up  apologising  for  its  malfunctioning  (Koskenniemi,  2005).  See also  Bernstorff’s 
description  of international law having  to steer a course between  the two evils of Scylla and Charybdis 
(2006, p. 1015). 
 
7 As advocated by Luhmann,  who  suggests that  it is the  function  of ‘scientific’  (i.e. oriented  around  the 
distinction  true–false) legal theory that should constitute  the legal object of study (2004, p. 57). 
 
8 In the sense that such observations tend to proceed naively, observe what they observe and attribute their 
results to the world (and thus remain unaware of the forces that lie behind the constructed  result).
  
 
 
 
more controlled (and thus more adequately complex) formula of ‘because of X, there is Y’  – or, in 
systemic terminology, ‘because of system X, the resulting  environment of Y is constructed’. Here, 
certainty   inheres   in t h e    reoccurring   patterns   of  society  where   one  finds  a  set  of  clearly 
differentiated   and  typified  communicative  filters  (i.e.  functional   systems) –   a  phenomenon 
Luhmann  (1989) describes as functional  differentiation.  Of significance is the way in which  each 
functional  system draws its boundaries  and constructs its resulting environment,  which, according 
to Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,  is an  elaborate  charade: ‘an  illusion  by and  for the  system’  to 
allow it to function  (2009, p. 81). As a means for discovery rather  than  an end in itself, consider 
for example the descriptive formula, because the ILS employs the code justice/non-justice  and its 
programme   of  legal  norms  to  allocate  these  values  (and  thus  draw  boundaries),  the  system 
functions  to take measures against conflict formations. The same can be said for other functional 
systems; because the political system employs the code government/opposition and its programme 
of ideologies to allocate values, the system functions to facilitate collectively binding decisions; or, 
because  the  economic  system  employs  the  code  payment/non-payment  and  its  programme  of 
prices, the system functions to manage resource scarcities; or, because the science system employs 
the  code truth/non-truth and  its programme  of theories,  the  system functions  to minimise  risk 
within  society.9 
The value of employing this functional analysis is because it offers a template for understanding 
how law operates in contradistinction with other  social formations. That is, it captures  how the 
processes of functional  differentiation  potentially  feed into  the  law’s  self-description10   and  give 
way to a recurrent  stream  of paradoxes, this  being  namely  the  paradox  of different  functional 
systems  employing  different  criteria  of success and  relevance,  with  the  result  that  this  quickly 
trivialises  international law’s  aspirations  of obtaining  meaningful  ‘rational  consensus’,  because 
nothing  any longer can be described as necessary or problematic  in any objective sense. Although 
employing this descriptive approach  will inevitably  offer an analysis that  is ‘more to a labyrinth 
than  to a highway  to a happy end’,11  it can guarantee  ‘at least’ that its observations are ‘correctly 
false’  (Luhmann,  1987,  p.  150). And, from here on, liberated from the  motivations  of worldview 
architectonics   that   make   us  humans   extremely   crooked   subjects,  the   proposed   theoretical 
framework  aspires to work out the reoccurring  patterns  under  which  international law 
institutionalises paradoxes into a more harmless, bounded, permitted  contradiction.  This we may 
begin at the ILS periphery, the law’s context, as will be explored next. 
 
 
III. Theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Context 
At the periphery of the ILS is the field of political international relations. Here, mutual interferences 
between law and politics is a necessary precondition for maintaining the ‘andness’ of both systems 
(Luhmann, 2006, p. 46) – that is, the unity  of components  making up their systemic contextures. 
One particular example is treaty agreements. From law’s perspective, treaties form part of the legal 
system’s self-defined environment, its object of study and hence the focus of certain legal 
communications. But, from the  political  systems  perspective,  treaties  form  a  self-reproductive 
 
9 See e.g. Borch for a more detailed  introduction to the  mechanisms  of functional  differentiation  (2011, 
pp. 66–92). 
10 Self-description, meaning  the established  difference between  what  the legal system is (i.e. its own 
communications such  as legal argumentation or court  decisions) and  what  it is not  (i.e. other  systemic 
communications). 
 
11   This quote, according to Vandenberghe, is how Luhmann,  in his dry sense of humour,  more specifically 
characterised his theory of social systems theory; see Vandenberghe (1999, p. 54). 
  
 
 
 
interaction system whereby the contractual parties define their own environments and interact with 
these environments accordingly. In this way, treaties are not only created following the legal system 
codes of legal/illegal, but are also expressions of political  international relations.  Thus, the ILS’s 
peripheral  autopoiesis  is not completely  established (Mattheis, 2012, p. 640) and this is why one 
speaks of the ‘politics of international law’. 
The paradox of upstream–downstream dichotomies as explained above helps to illustrate these 
operations.  The demands for short-term  economic  growth  produce  the  legal communications of 
the right to development, whereas the demands for long-term ecological preservation  produce the 
legal communications of precaution  and restraint. How, then, to manage the paradox? On the one 
hand, the  relevant  parties  might  decide to opt  out  of the  formalities  of the  legal system. This 
might entail, for example, the deployment of more bounded  interaction  systems such as technical 
expert joint commissions, to more demanding synchronising  systems such as consultations  and 
diplomatic  negotiations.  However, what  keeps  the  unity  of these  systems  is not  the  denial  or 
suppression  of conflict communications (as in when  a communication is rejected, when  a no is 
answered  with  a  no), but  rather  it  is the  promotion   and  enhancement of a  specific  type  of 
organised conflict communications, the former, for example, being the amplification  of specific 
uncertainties so that  conflict communications might  become more visible, more tractably  bound 
by the  regulations  of science  and  thus  more  harmless,  whereas,  in  the  latter,  the  emphasis  is 
placed  upon  employing  positive  incentives  such  as  monetary  compensation  so that  risks  are 
instead repackaged as a more future-accommodating problem of costs. 
On the other hand,  if the  interaction  system becomes sucked into  the  undertow  of an ever- 
widening  arena of conflict topics, the system might  mutate  into a conflict system. That is, it will 
produce   claims t h a t    originate   instead   at  the   decision-making   level  of  the   ‘expectation   of 
expectations’. For example, under these dynamics, it is not so much that State A has experienced a 
decline  in its water  quality  or quantity  due to State B  constructing  a dam upstream  and  reacts 
against this infrastructure development; nor is it that State A expects the construction  of the dam 
by State B will cause a decline in its water quality or quantity  and therefore seeks to forestall State 
B’s actions. Rather, it is because State A expects that State B expects confrontation and therefore 
defines State B’s practices as ‘appropriately’ hostile. Thus, State A perpetuates the conflict structure 
by answering  ‘no  with  no’  (Luhmann,  1995a,  p.  566) to further  its  own  logics of adversarial 
interests  and  priorities.  However, such gain in  momentum of contradiction  does not  mean  the 
conflict system can proceed in a manner  that avoids the ILS altogether. Although the ILS does not 
seek to attract  conflict to retain  its identity, it nonetheless  predicates: it demands  that 
communications must respect the possibility of arriving at a decision in the centre, namely in the 
courts – one that, however ‘foundationless’ binding decisions may turn out to be, these symbols of 
normativity  at least have the potential  to produce certain  societal positive effects, namely that of 
legal security, stabilisation of expectations and the pacification of conflicts. 
 
3.2 Operations 
Operation refers here to the claims of conflict systems to which their distinctiveness is generated by 
their anticipation of a court’s ruling. Located at the centre, these operations play a very prominent 
role in the  ILS because  it  is only  here  whereby  perceived  ruling  obligations  are rooted  in  the 
system itself, and not influenced  by factors outside it (Mattheis, 2012, p. 633). Moreover, it is only 
here whereby these  operations   stand  in  a  circular  relation   to  the  ILS structures   –  its  self- 
preservation,  equality,  reciprocity  and interdependence filters – and are processed through  them 
to selectively produce new operations. In doing so, since each filter derives from the goal of self- 
preservation  (D’Amato, 2005, p. 364), this arguably offers a powerful heuristic  tool for explaining 
why  the  ILS produces  an  intense sensibility to specific  questions and,  at  the  same  time,  a  great 
indifference   towards  everything else,   including   the   operational   logics  of  other   systems.  These 
  
 
 
 
conceptual tools  I propose are useful for working  out the manner  to which  the ILS proceeds in 
determining  law’s validity. 
 
3.3 Self-preservation f i l t e r  
The self-preservation filter refers here to a contingency formula of ‘justice’ or ‘injustice’ that the ILS 
employs  for self-perpetuation  (Luhmann,  2004,  pp. 211–229). It is the means  whereby  the  ILS 
compensates  society for the loss of traditional  natural  law via replacement  by a ‘value-free’ notion 
of justice (King and Thornhill,  2003, p. 66) delineated  by texts, authorities,  concepts, rhetoric  and 
legally  determined   imaginations.   It  is  in  other   words  a  formula   determined   not  by  fixed 
normative   roots,  but  rather   via  circular  references  produced  by  law  itself  (Luhmann,  2004, 
pp. 214–216), enabling  the system to maintain  the presentation that  it is still the risk carrier of 
societal evolution.12 
We may identify two main aspects of this contingency formula. First, the formula enables the ILS 
to prioritise not so much how it might end disputes or achieve specific purposes, but rather it enables 
the law to position itself in a manner  so as to establish the eternal recursive autopoiesis  of law13: 
whether  A or  B’s  position  is more  conducive  to  achieving  the  ILS’s  goal of systemic  survival 
(D’Amato, 2009,  p.  908). Second, this in turn facilitates the law to package information  for legal 
decisions in such a way that  the appearance  of ‘theoretically systematized  positive law based on 
rules and principles  may be maintained’ (Luhmann, 1995a, p. 216). As a consequence, the ILS can 
therefore  present  itself not  as a fuzzy, ambiguous,  devoid of content  alternative,  but  rather  as a 
system of standards  with  factual content:  B’s position  was consonant  with  the standard  whereas 
A’s clearly was not (D’Amato, 2009, p. 909). 
A question arising, however, is this: if communications between the ILS and other social systems 
occur only in a way that is understandable by law, then how might the ILS overcome the dilemma 
that these communications would  potentially  carry very little  influence?  It does so, as will be 
explored next, by restructuring basic reference points from that of the concrete interests of nation- 
states to that of the functional differentiation  of specific legal issues. 
 
3.4 Equitable filter 
The equitable filter refers here to a contingency formula employed by the ILS as a schema to search 
for reasons and values made legally valid via its programmes. This formula, however, does not rely 
upon external notions  of who or what  should  be treated  equally, but adapts in a uniquely  legal 
way general abstract notions  of equality  (King and Thornhill,  2003, p. 64). We may call this the 
ILS’s ‘operational  closure’  whereby  the  cognitive  openness  of the  law rests upon  its normative 
closure. These two seemingly incompatible concepts are explained next. 
 
3.4.1 Normative closure 
Normative closure refers here to the generalised legal code of legal/non-legal that the ILS employs for 
determining which communications are recognised as relevant for law. Though the code is utilised 
for determining the limits of legal regulation – and, in doing so, forces justice to take on its form – it is 
also paradoxically burdened  with the task of presenting  itself as containing  all concepts of justice, 
this being to maintain  the basic requirement that  the law should  be fair and be seen to be fair, 
even though deploying specific and universal  decision-making  criteria can only mean something 
 
 
12   For an alternative reading, Zumbansen (2001) argues that law and politics have actually ceased to be the ‘risk 
carriers’ of societal evolution. 
 
13   As exemplified in the IJC’s decision concerning the Gabcikovo Dam whereby Bostian argues the court avoided 
pronouncements on several topics, mostly environmental, and took a cautious approach so as to uphold the 
principles of treaty law (1998, pp. 426–427). 
  
 
 
akin to regularity or consistency  – that  is, without  consideration  for a particular  states or actors 
concrete interests. 
Nonetheless, in employing the generalised legal/non-legal binary code, conflict realities are also 
inevitably falsified. This is because, though legal communications are directed at conflicts, this does 
not mean  the  ILS actually  resolves conflicts. Rather, when the  law observes conflicts, it simply 
transforms  them  into technical  legal problems about right and wrong, because this is all the law 
can understand,  and this is all that it can consider. Identifying causation of harm (i.e. the facts of 
who committed  a certain act) after all is not the law’s priority. It is instead the maintenance of a 
self-referential legal specific model for reducing  complexities  that  is the  law’s  primary  concern: 
which attributable  legal subjects (e.g. states or entities) should be rewarded and which attributable 
legal subjects should be punished  for this act. 
Assigning rights to legal subjects is therefore one of the most important tools of the ILS for 
enabling transformation of conflicts into legal problems. An internationally unlawful action or 
omission breaching  a treaty cannot,  after all, be taken  to court  if there  can be no attribution of 
responsibility.  And, even if a claim  is taken  to court,  everything  is likely  be excluded  but  the 
relevant  facts for  the  determination of right  and  wrong  in  considering  what  counts  as legal, 
namely which facts are legal facts. The ILS thus simplifies conflicts and specifies precisely what is 
included in the  conflict and disregards the  rest, if the  rest cannot  be formulated  in legal terms. 
For, in t h e   end,  it  is  law’s  conditional   programmes   that  are  employed  here  whereby  legal 
argumentative redundancies  remain  the  reference  point  for judicial  decisions: only  if fact X  is 
given, can the decision be made Y is legal or illegal. As exemplified by the fact that jurisdictions of 
most international courts  are limited  to  the  rules  of the  treaty  instruments that  set them  up, 
whereby fundamental  changes to the law can only be applied only in exceptional cases. 
One can see, therefore, why the ILS operations are heavily biased towards redundancy. Indeed, 
though this is not  desirable,  it  is fatally  necessary  because  only  by translating  conflicts  into  a 
question  of law and non-law can the ILS generate a ‘historical machine’ for ensuring  the constancy 
of equality of treatment. And only by doing this can the ILS maintain the symbolism of normativity. 
The alternative  would see the ILS unable to presuppose and accept itself, never ending its ‘quest for 
finding the final reason of law’ (Luhmann, 2004, p. 426), with the consequences that the law would 
no longer be presumed to be able to solve any social conflict put before it, whether  in legal terms or 
within a legal rationality. It would therefore cease to exist as a legal system. 
Nevertheless, in the event that the application of legal coding fails to stabilise expectations and 
ends up endangering a conflict system’s whole, how then might the ILS deal with this? Moreover, as 
will be explored next, if the ILS is to maintain its autopoiesis, then how might it simultaneously make 
invisible the paradoxical question of whether the ‘original sin’ of legal right and wrong exists rightly 
or wrongly? 
 
3.4.2 Cognitive openness 
Cognitive openness refers here to how the ILS adapts to disappointments. It is the means by which 
the ILS employs various purposive programmes that set legal objectives irrespective of constitutive or 
regulatory conditions (e.g. the agreed treaty texts). This allows the ILS to derive measures to be taken 
in the present for future goals: to decide Y for the purpose of X – in other words, to legitimise the 
inclusion of non-legal communications for the purposes  of balancing  interests. In the context of 
trans-boundary   waters,  for  instance,   this   could   be  formulated   as  follows:  to  include   state 
obligations  towards  individuals  or non-state  actors previously  excluded from a treaty system, for 
the purposes of attaining equitable utilisation.14 
 
 
14   As exemplified in the 2002 Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin, Article 21(2), in which states were 
asked to facilitate monitoring o f  treaty  implementation by providing  information  to the  general public. 
  
 
 
 
In practice, these purposive  programmes  are employed  to limit  the  degrees of freedom  of a 
conflict system. They do so by breaking through rules of the type qui suoiure utitur neminem laedit15 
or, more specifically, the concepts of absolute territorial  sovereignty/absolute  territorial  integrity.16 
Consequently, they make it possible for the ILS to treat in special circumstances a state (or entity) 
that acted lawfully (or perceives itself as doing so) as if it had acted unlawfully. In other words, the 
law’s ‘proceduralisation’ (McIntyre, 2010) reintroduces  uncertainty via the medium  of substantive 
emptiness  (i.e. purposive  programmes)  in  order  to  attain  the  advantages  of co-ordination  and 
overcome paradoxes ‘arising from the need to know the unknowable’  (Luhmann,  1995b, p. 294). 
Their deployment, however, also comes at the price of developing both simultaneously progressive 
and regressive tendencies in the regulation of conflict systems, as will be shown. 
On the one hand, purposive programmes are progressive. This is because they are a more effective 
way of having an aim ascribed to a rule. If the goal is for development, then the concept of equitable 
utilisation for instance can serve to validate the lawfulness of new (or increased) utilisations  of an 
international  watercourse.  This  helps  to  legitimise  all  of the  side  effects of development  –  a 
necessary  prerequisite  for stabilising  motivations  (Kang, 2017). But purposive  programmes  also 
function  as a kind  of indisputable  medium  for the  ‘reception  of all possible preferences,  value 
shifts and ideologies, which are not controlled by the legal system’ (Luhmann, 1995b, p. 297). This is 
because their legitimacy does not derive from the official truth  of validity claims, but rather it is from 
the co-ordination  of learning processes. For example, if one state understands  equity as a distributive  
concept17 whereas the other focuses on its corrective aspects,18  the ILS overcomes the paradox, by 
simply keeping it at bay, by replacing the freezing effect of a truth-seeking  consensus with  the  
pliability  of  whether   the  relevant  subjects  have  cognitively  grasped  the  normative expectations  
involved  in  the  law’s  autopoiesis.  That is, whether  these  expectations  such  as the introduction of 
various risk assessments permit  conditions  of reversibility  needed for enabling  a 
‘general readiness to accept,  within  certain  limits  of tolerance,  decisions which  are still without 
content’ (Luhmann, 1969, p. 28). In this sense, purposive programmes serve as essential carriers of 
the  law’s  differentiation,  for  they  enable  exceptions  to  be  manoeuvred   in  order  to  overcome 
paradoxes in cases where it is too hard to follow the law’s coding. 
On the other hand, purposive  programmes  are regressive. This is because they legitimise the 
choice of means and thus generate injustice (Luhmann, 2004, p. 223). In other words, they nurture a 
l e g a l   culture   of  argumentation  that   produces   a  high   degree  of  variety  emphasising   the 
individual   nature   of  each  case  and  its  content   with  vague  general  formulae  like  ‘equitable 
utilisation’ or ‘balancing of interests’. But the more conflict systems observe these purposive 
programmes – and, thus, are more receptive to changing  preferences – the more conflict systems 
will rely for their  actual  functioning  on organisations.  This will lead to the outsourcing  of the 
law’s normative  authority  to the adoption  of global expert regimes – indeed, the new natural  law 
(Koskenniemi, 2009,  p. 410), which  gives functional  priority  to the forms set by technology  and 
capital  investment.   As a  consequence,  due  to  the  modus  operandi   of  organisations   whose 
preferences  are  to  communicate with  other  organisations,  whose  tendency  is to  treat  private 
 
 
Available at:  <http://www.savacommission.org/dms/docs/dokumenti/documents_publications/basic_documents/ 
fasrb.pdf> (accessed 24 May 2017). 
15  ‘He who relies on his right harms no one.’ 
16   See note 1. 
 
17   This being whether equitable allocation is achieved so as to maintain  each riparian  state’s current  level of 
economic development. 
 
18   This being whether equity requires states that have less access to financial and technical means to be entitled 
to water allocation so as to allow them to ‘catch up’ with other states. 
  
 
 
persons as if they were another organisation (Luhmann, 1997, p. 834) and whose functioning depends 
upon excluding almost every person except for the organisation one is included in – this is nothing 
more than the acknowledgement that society will increasingly equip itself with the capacity for 
discrimination through  its organisations (Luhmann, 2000a, p. 393). 
The question  arising  then  is this:  how  might  the  ILS compensate  conflict  systems  for  its 
falsification of realities and its outsourcing  of normative  authority  to organisational  systems? This I 
shall turn to next, by re-filtering the equality filter through the principle of reciprocity. 
 
3.5 Reciprocity f i l t e r  
The reciprocity filter refers here to a contingency formula that is employed in order to compensate for 
the ILS’s relatively weak instruments of governance. Indeed, this is because ‘(a)s long as the 
international order lacks a centralized enforcement machinery and thus has to live with 
autodetermination’,  reciprocity  will  serve as ‘the  principal  leitmotiv,  a constructive,  mitigating 
and stabilizing force’  (Simma, 1984, p. 400). Nonetheless, like the equitable filter, the reciprocity 
filter also functions  operatively closed, in the sense that it operates within  its own internal  logics, 
but  also behaves as cognitively  open  to the  environment, when  faced with  events  or facts that 
frustrate its system’s normative  closure. 
 
3.5.1 Normative closure 
Normative closure refers here to the generalised legal code of lawful unlawful that the ILS employs 
for determining the  legal acceptance of social behaviour. Of relevance is how the principle  of 
reciprocity,  or  more  specifically  a  ‘tit-for-a-different-tat’  violation  rule,19   is  deployed  by  treaty 
systems  in  the  form  of  a  conditional   programme:  if  State  B  violates  an  international  legal 
entitlement of State A, then the losses of State A should (in principle) be transmitted back to State 
B. Here, transmission occurs because the conditional  programme  grants State A the right to deploy 
legal countermeasures,  such as the release from its own obligations of adhering  to other primary 
provisions  in the agreed treaty  with  State B. In doing so, this serves as a symbolic apparatus to 
allow State B to identify whether  its expectations are in line with the law, and thus whether  these 
are cost-effective expectations.20 
Nonetheless, such conditional programmes only make sense in situations whereby the existence of 
rights and duties are reversible. That is, if the complementarity of rights and duties derived from a 
treaty system’s substantial reciprocity result from the actual equivalence of mutual  advantages. In 
practice, however, if this is attained (often based on concessions granted  outside treaty systems), 
then such stability is always a hard-won achievement  because what this actually enables is the 
justification  of  a  considerable  measure  of  inequality  in  points  of  time  and  attainments.  For 
example, in terms of time, the typical conditional  programme  may employ the formula: if State B 
suffers from  water  scarcity  during  time  period  Y,  then  State A,  according  to  the  agreed treaty 
escape clauses, shall permit State B to deliver less water than it would have to under normal 
circumstances,  and vice versa, while, in terms of attainments, the typical conditional  programme 
may be: if State B can more efficiently utilise the watercourse, then State A shall forego actual use 
of the  wet  water  in  return  for monetary  compensation from  State B.  In this  sense, the  above 
conditional  programmes enable greater differentiation  not only because they employ schematic if/ 
then  decisional-making  models, but also because they enable the increase of bearable insecurity, 
and thus allow conflict systems to acquire an amount  of complexity, form and certainty  that they 
might not otherwise have had. 
 
 
19   See e.g. D’Amato (2014, p. 663). 
20   These expectations are also magnified if one takes into consideration  the possible forceful reaction of the 
entire community of states; see D’Amato (2014, p. 675).
  
 
 
 
Yet, beneath this veil of unquestioned reciprocal mutual advantages, the ILS conceals a paradox: 
that the order by which the reciprocity filter validates itself depends upon an equality that does not 
exist. Of course, the  ILS could not  conduct  itself otherwise  if it were to expose this  paradox  of 
presupposing  norms  about  spheres  of jurisdiction,  for the  ILS cannot  be allowed to disintegrate 
just because State A’s expectations  for realising reciprocal mutual  advantages are profound, State 
B’s  better  and  State C’s more  capable  of attaining  consensus.  Instead, the  ILS must  have  at its 
disposal  a  mode  of  disappointment  relief  that  provides  clear  outcomes  so  that  at  the  least 
the assumption  of consensus  can follow. This is what the principle of formal equality achieves – 
the demand  for equal treatment,  as derived from the principle  of voluntary  state consent. But the 
price that the ILS must  pay for such a mode of disappointment relief is that  it falsifies conflicts 
precisely   by   not   taking   into   consideration    the   unequal    distribution    of   communicative 
opportunities structuring  conflict systems. For example, a water-sharing agreement  delineated  by 
fixed allocations  cannot  be challenged  even if this  produces  more  problems  for one  state  than 
another  (or another  system),21   but  rather  only  if it  has  been  brought  about  by illegal means. 
Indeed, such a paradoxical legal order may even permit states to avoid the ‘strict application  of the 
law in their mutual  relations’ (Paulus, 2011, p. 124) and thus gives rise to what Teubner describes 
as ‘hitting  the  bottom’22:  that  only  when  catastrophe  is imminent will  it  become  essential  for 
systems  to  limit   their   compulsive   expansion,   and   to  ecologise  by  becoming   receptive  for 
environmental interests. This could be read as a restatement o f  the principles  of reciprocity  and 
mutual  recognition  (Guski, 2013, p. 529). 
Viewed in this way, the question arising from such a paradox is therefore this: if it is true that the 
self-correction of society appears to occur only at the last minute, then how might the ILS mitigate 
these self-destructive tendencies? I submit, as will be explored next, that it is via cognitive sensitivity 
that the ILS finds its answer. 
 
 
3.5.2 Cognitive openness 
Cognitive openness refers in this special circumstance to how the ILS understands subjective rights that 
draw new distinctions without  provision for equilibrium  and reciprocity in law. It is the means by 
which the ILS disrespects treaty agreements by imposing rights and duties upon  one state, but not 
necessarily a counter-right with corresponding  counter-duties. Indeed, this ability to hold ready the 
capacity to make asymmetrical relations (i.e. justifying procedural inequalities) and maintain 
independence f r o m  a conflict systems structural  biases23  is a necessary mechanism  for making the 
law compatible  with societal complexity. We may call this the programme of purposive reciprocity 
that is employed by the ILS to devise more sophisticated ways of reading the law’s landscape. 
Here, the deployment of logical reason is of particular  relevance, its purposive programme: to 
transform t h e   law  of treaty  norms  into  the  law  of reasonable  arguments  for the  purposes  of 
attaining  the balancing of interests. In other words, reason is employed here to argue with equal 
voice b o t h    for  reparations   (equality)   and   for  exceptions   to   reparations   (inequality).   The 
unmitigated demand to refute reparations  is clearly wrong, violating the natural  (and the created!) 
legal norms  of  treaty  texts.  And th e   unmitigated   demand   for  reparations   is  clearly  wrong, 
 
 
21   For example, the Almaty Agreement of the Aral Basin sea (1992) neglects the need for a wider, more flexible 
landscape of equitable utilisation by fixing instead the Soviet-time status quo of the then-established rules, that 
being a 50/50 split of the water. Available at: <http://www.icwc-aral.uz/statute1.htm> (accessed 24 May 2017). 
22   This is what Teubner describes a drug addict does before he is willing to go into detox (2012, p. 11). 
 
23   Structural biases such as bilateralist systems and their situations  of equilibrium.  As exemplified by the UN 
Environmental Programmes observation that  80 per cent of existing watercourse  agreements  are bilateral, 
even though  other countries may also share the same river; see UNEP (2006, p. 35). 
  
 
 
 
violating the law of exceptions as ascertained by customary norms.24  The paradox (of justice existing 
only if injustice is attributed  meaning) in other words reappears as tautology – justice is what is just, 
as reasonable reason (and hence ‘unreasonable’ is defined ambiguously). But of course tautologies too 
need to be de-tautologised for, otherwise, only conservative self-descriptions might be attained, even 
counter-intuitive ones. How then to drive the paradox back into its invisible retreat? 
Restating the problem in the form of an abstract preventative consensus is one solution, its 
formulations  in the  context  of trans-boundary  waters:  to impose  the  duty  of no significant  harm 
(NSH) even in the absence of treaty agreement, for the purposes of attaining  equitable utilisation.25 
Here, the idea is to correspond to the nature of the task, namely that the inclusion  of the natural  or 
physical environment and its biodiversity fundamentally changes the nature  of the law. No longer 
are reciprocal   tit-for-tat  strategies  –  scratch  my  back  and  I’ll  scratch  yours  –  the  ‘categorical 
imperative’ of society. Such strategies assume that the problem has its roots in society and therefore 
can be solved in  the  social dimension  (Luhmann,  1989,  pp.  73–74). Rather, the  introduction of 
subjective rights precludes one from requiring  reciprocity  (Luhmann, 1997). It becomes instead an 
issue of how to fulfil the complementarity of expectations: State A expects State B to have the right to 
develop on the precondition of NSH, and State B expects State A to have precisely this expectation. 
Legal problem solutions,  in other  words,  no longer  depend  upon  reciprocal  mutual  consent,  but 
rather rely increasingly on non-negotiable  norms such as NSH that seek instead to redistribute  risk. 
That is, they develop behavioural patterns of readiness to learn, to accept the non-fulfilment of 
expectations and to adapt to new circumstances instead of insisting on the agreed treaty stipulations, 
the  point  in  case being,  for  instance,  the  principle  of good  neighbourliness,  which,  within  its 
framework,  invokes  the  idea that  states  must  tolerate  a certain  level of (inevitable)  interference 
within their territorial space, especially in the event of trans-boundary  pollution.26 
Of course, this does not mean the ILS can guarantee these expectations. It does mean, however, 
that the law can guarantee they are maintained as expectations, even in instances of disappointment, 
and that one can know this and communicate it in advance. The fact the NSH purposive programme 
does not allocate values on the basis of extra-legal differences (i.e. was factual harm  committed?) 
exemplifies  this,  for  its  concern,  rather,  is  of how  to  maintain   a  self-simplifying  device  that 
stabilises the distinction  made between lawful state practices and unlawful ones. 
The NSH purposive programme thus serves two important functions. First, it necessarily reduces 
the ILS’s complexity by dually functioning internally as a conditional programme. As a consequence, 
this keeps the ILS safe from the ‘big  questions’,  frees it from the responsibility  of consequences, 
enables reliance upon  its own social constructions  of events and thus validates the law to refuse 
to  learn  from  facts. In  short, this   protects  the  law  from  the  uncertainties of experience  and 
projections of that experience which may threaten  to destabilise the law’s normative  certainty  (or 
relative  certainty).  In other words, it grants  the  ILS unique  rationality  with  which  it can select 
decisions and eliminate  other  possibilities by instead  spreading illogicalities into small, localised 
leaps, thus in turn generating the complexity of decision-making. 
Indeed, it is precisely through reduction that conditions for complexity can be built.27  Hence, the 
NSH programme also simultaneously enhances the ILS’s complexity. It transforms paradoxical legal 
 
 
24   See e.g. the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful  Acts 2001, Article 35. 
Available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ddb8f804.html>  (accessed 24 May 2017). 
25   See UNWC 1997, ‘United Nations  Convention  on  the  Law of Non-Navigational  Uses of International 
Watercourses’, Article 7(2). Available at: <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_ 
1997.pdf> (accessed 24 May 2017). 
26   For example, this case was made for acid rain; see Lier (1980, p. 104). 
 
27   Or, more specifically, ‘Reduction is a necessary condition for the ability to resonate; reduction of complexity is 
a necessary condition for building complexity’; see Luhmann (2004, pp. 382–383).
  
 
 
 
coding and its search for specific results into a device for creative social learning within  the legal 
system, thus  enhancing  its cognitive  capacity,  but  at the  expense of creating  the  conditions  for 
deviance  and  the  disturbance  of order. This is exemplified, for instance,  when  the  law ordains 
‘planned measures’28  granting  conflict  systems the  capacity  for conflict  communications: in the 
absence  of  trust,  ‘regular  exchange  of  data  and  information’29    would  unlikely   resolve  risk- 
endangered   conflicts,  but  merely  succeed  as  a  delaying  strategy;  in  a  globalised  ‘3.0’  world 
(Friedman,  2006), ‘the  notification  of natural  emergencies  or  those  caused  by human   activity’ 
would likely only reinforce an existing disposition, because ‘quantitative analysis always becomes 
irrelevant  where disasters are to be feared’ (Luhmann, 1993, p. 149); in ‘the notification  of planned 
measures’,  if  understood,  this  would  always  provide  plenty  of opportunities for  accepting  or 
rejecting   the   content   offered;  in  the   presentation   of  a  quantitative   environmental  impact 
assessment of risky situations,  this would ‘hardly likely to impress anyone’, ‘because quantitative 
calculations  are widely known to be capable of manipulation’ (Luhmann, 1993, p. 149). And there 
the eruption of social situation  reproduces an indeterminacy‐producing paradox whereby 
informational difficulties gain such a dominant position in the enforcement  of ordained rules that 
all  other  questions  move  into  the  background   in  comparison,  and  the  success  of  enforcing 
‘planned measures’ practically becomes a problem of information. 
How, then, is legal order possible at all? And how might the ILS answer responsively with rational 
arguments to the extreme demands of law’s ecologies, whilst simultaneously fulfilling the internal 
requirements  of normative  consistency? This I shall turn to next. 
 
 
3.6 Interdependence filter 
The  interdependence  filter  refers  here  to  a  contingency   formula   that   the  ILS employs  for 
paradoxically maintaining its autonomy. This is because the more conflict systems recruit conflict 
topics  from  other  systems, the  stronger  are  the  forces towards  autonomy  of the  ILS. And  the 
stronger the juridification  of conflict systems, the stronger in turn is the autonomy of the law, but at 
the price of an increased interdependence of the ILS. By employing the methodological tools of 
social, spatial and conceptual  dimensions,  what follows is therefore an investigation  to work out 
under   what   conditions   might   the   ILS  afford  structural    changes,   without   simultaneously 
endangering  its own continued  existence. 
 
 
3.6.1 Social dimension 
The social dimension r e f e r s  here to the way identities  are created and maintained.  Of particular 
relevance is how the ILS employs the concept of human rights to enable conflict systems to catch 
up  with  their  environments.   The  idea  here  is  to  offer  them   legal  counter-mechanisms  for 
equalising  disparate  access to functional  systems such  as health,  as exemplified  when  political 
impulses  for the  reversal of exclusions  constitutionalised the  human  right  to water.30   However, 
within  the context  of trans-boundary  waters, these impulses  have tended  to play out  elsewhere. 
This is because, when disparate access occurs, the rule that sovereign states should (as opposed to 
ought to) facilitate  assistance31   only  takes  on  the  task of mediating  the  experiences  of political 
interests:  it does  not  suggest  actions  for  determining   what  ought  to  be  added  beyond  law’s 
 
 
28   See e.g. UNWC 1997, Article 11–19, above note 25. 
29   This is, however, also subject to national security concerns; see e.g. UNWC 1997, Article 31, above note 25. 
30   See e.g. United Nations Resolution 64/292 on the human right to water and sanitation. Available at: <http:// 
www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/64/292> (accessed 24 May 2017). 
31   See e.g. Committee o n   Economic, Social and  Cultural  Rights, 2002, The Right to Water,  Article 11–12. 
Available at: <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/docs/CESCR_GC_15.pdf> (accessed 24 May 2017).
  
 
 
 
tautological should. Indeed, it hardly offers any ethical solutions, but rather  it merely throws  the 
problem  back to the political  system in such a way that  makes it clear that  there  are no purely 
ethical answers. How then to overcome the paradox? 
Significantly, it is the ‘contemporary paradox’ of human  rights (Luhmann,  2004,  p.  487) that 
deprives political systems of their dominance. This is because it is no longer exclusively the world 
of states and their  reciprocal  treaty  agreements  where  norms  of law are subsequently  breached. 
Rather, human  right claims are validated increasingly  by their very violation  and the subsequent 
outcry,32   as exemplified in the Rogun hydropower  project in Tajikistan: Uzbekistan-based protest 
movements  oppose dam construction;  a scandal develops; the media decry violations; the world 
bank   commissions   feasibility  studies.33    Nonetheless,   if  it  is  true   that   such   a  sequence   of 
scandalisation   shows  a  high  degree  of affinity  with  communication  channelled   via  the  mass 
media,  then  these  communications must  also  satisfy the  media’s  rigorous  selection  filters  for 
whether  the  event  will surprise  and ‘liven  up the  scene’,  generate  feelings ‘of common  concern 
and outrage’  or create ‘self-induced  uncertainty’  so as to guarantee  good prospects for sustaining 
autopoietic  self-reproduction (what will happen  in tomorrow’s news?) (Luhmann, 2000b, pp. 28–29). 
Yet, as a consequence of these filters operating on the basis of forgetting,34  the political system can 
neither   rely u p o n ,  nor  be  expected  to  depend   upon,  the  quantitative   ‘nonconsensual   and 
nonpersonal’  (Moeller, 2005,  p.  137) data calculations of public  opinion  frequently  presented  by 
the  mass media. Instead, it is left to operate  on  the  basis of guessing the  responses  to its own 
world-political projects, strategies and interventions,  and adjusting these decisions accordingly, so 
as to maintain  the production  of collectively binding decisions. 
Viewed in this way, one can see therefore why ‘human right movements are not antagonistic to 
society’, but are rather ‘more or less in perfect accord with functional differentiation’. It is no wonder, 
as Moeller writes, ‘that their semantics are shared by most politicians, by the mass media, and even by 
the economy’ (2005, p. 108). Yet, underneath this systemically conformist development in society lies 
the more painful factual (lived) experience of rights – the observation that the inclusion35 of everyone 
within funct ional   differentiation  has not being completely  successful. Indeed, it is precisely this 
embarrassment as to why society responds with the rhetorical exuberance of universal rights that 
aspires to exclude no one (Verschraegen, 2002,  p.  268). But such exuberance is also paradoxical. 
This is because, though functional  systems must  treat and present  their associated environments 
as  equals,  they  must,   however,  function   unequally.   For  instance,   one  can  speak  of  equal 
opportunities for  access to  clean  water,  but  this  cannot  designate  equality  in  result,  because 
systems have to function unequally: one must have money at their disposal in order to pay for 
recreational  uses of water; one must pass exams in order to become a practitioner;  and one must 
keep to conventions  of litigation in order to prevent violent outbreaks; and so on. 
Thus, to deny the principles of equality as well as inequality that are basic to function systems is 
to deny  the  impossibility  of avoiding  differences  in  life conditions.  Dreaming o f  an  inclusive 
universal  society is therefore  not revolutionary;  it is conservative  (Moeller, 2005, p. 107). In fact, 
however   well-in tentioned   aspirations    may   be,  such   activism,   as   a   by-product,   creates 
unconsciously  the conditions  for what  Luhmann  describes as a ‘totalitarian  logic’  that  is readily 
converted in to   a logic of time  (1997, p. 628). This is because efforts to  assert for instance  the 
 
 
32   More specifically, this  is what  Fischer-Lescano (2007) terms  lex humana and  the  rise of ‘world  society’s 
customary law’ (and not ‘international customary law’!). 
33   See the Economist, ‘Water Wars in Central Asia: Dammed If They Do’, 29 September 2012. Available at: <http:// 
www.economist.com/node/21563764> (accessed 24 May 2017). 
 
34   According to Luhmann, this is because the mass media construct systemic memory not through recollection, 
but mainly by forgetting (2000b, p. 101). 
35   Inclusion refers here to the way humans are indicated, i.e. made relevant in communication.
  
 
 
 
human right to water, which are at least in part responses to a trade-law perspective that tends to treat 
water simply as a commodity  (Ellis, 2009), potentially  endanger  the principles  of precaution  and 
prevention  put  forth  by the  rationalities  of integrated  water  resource  management,36  the  result 
being, then, that, in the absence of a global ‘constitutional conflict of laws’ (Teubner, 2012, pp. 15– 
174), the future becomes the grand excuse for the projection  of dialectical developments.  State B 
claims that the construction  of a hydropower  dam will increase economic growth, supposing that a 
quantitative  surplus allows a better redistribution of resources; or State A enhances the effort in 
matters  of water security in order to allow a recovery operation  for the ‘backward’  (namely very 
small tribal societies that are mainly  isolated from the functional  systems of politics, law and the 
economy). Yet, in doing so, this leads to a phenomenon whereby ‘all exclusions are systematically 
understood as residual problems, and are interpreted in such a way that they become incapable of 
questioning  the totalitarian logic itself’ (Luhmann, 1997, pp. 625–626). 
This leads to another p ro b l e ma t iq u e ,  as will be explored next: if it is true  that  fundamental 
exclusions entail a dramatic  increase in both  individual  freedoms and risks (Verschraegen, 2002, p. 
269), then how ought the law to accommodate such a paradox? 
 
 
3.6.2 Spatial dimension 
The spatial dimension refers here to various materialities  (e.g. the topologies of a river or the data 
spread  about  these  topologies)  that  the  law recruits  as the  locus  for paradox  management.  In 
making productive use of materialities  that are afforded by, elicited from or ascribed by functional 
systems, the idea here is to simultaneously enable and limit a conflict system’s possibilities – that 
is, in  other  words, to  invent  new  distinctions  that  do  not  deny  the  paradox,  but  temporarily 
displace it and thus relieve it of its paralysing power (Teubner, 2001b, p. 32). For example, the task 
of the science system might be to fix the threshold of acceptable collateral effects incurred  on the 
river basin from hydropower  development.  The task of the political  system might  be to fix the 
final amount  of environmental pollution  acceptable to the public. And the task of the law might 
be then t o  refine, regulate  and  continue  these  operations  in  one  direction  (and  not  the  other) 
towards  the  desired  goals. But, whilst t h e s e   distinctions   serve  as  an  expedient  to  meet  the 
particular   demands  of  critical  observers,  the  paradox,  nevertheless,  just  like  the  sun,  passes 
underground and  reappears  in  the  future.  For, as Halsey puts  it, to delimit  the  more  ‘majestic’ 
aspects of nature  is to admit to the basically intrusive  character  of such operations  dividing ‘filth 
from cleanliness, pollution  from purity, violence from non-violence’  (2011, p. 219). Arguably, the 
demarcation of boundaries  is therefore what states cede not only to maintain  illusions of minimal 
dimensions  of the habitat  needed  for survival, but  also to justify ongoing  generalised  ecological 
violence. Law’s co-implications  with  violence  thus  demand  alternative  avenues  for shifting  the 
paradox out of sight. How can this be done? 
One solution is for the law to bypass the political system by basing its norm production instead 
upon  an economic systems formula for managing  scarcity. Key here is the language of prices. For 
instance, though  concepts  such as eco-services, eco-compensation  or benefit sharing  cannot  halt 
the  physical  processes  of ecological destruction,  they  can  at  least  improve  a conflict  system’s 
sensitivity towards ecological degradation  via the economic valuation  of ecological resilience and 
biodiversity. They can in other words make the future become more accessible. They can react to 
ecological destruction in numerous  self-referential ways, such as by attributing responsibility for it or 
by creating  new  cost categories and  market  opportunities for businessmen  (Luhmann,  1997, p. 
133). And they can store possibilities by granting conflict systems the capacity to lay claims on 
services or goods and the subsequent trading of futures via the mediums of money, as exemplified, 
 
 
36   See e.g. Tremblay (2011).
  
 
 
 
for instance, when the downstream state establishes a system of incentives, such as side-payments 
that change the behaviour  of upstream  polluters. Is the solution simply, then, for law to facilitate 
the flow of repayments  and allow for debt to be nominally  settled through  an economic system’s 
cyclical  processes? The answer  is a  definite  no  if one  takes  into  consideration  that  what  the 
economy really seeks is not equilibrium, but the continuing  self-reproduction of itself through  the 
medium of money. 
Here, the paradox reappears in the form of developing the complexity of the economy at the cost 
of ignoring ecological sensitivity.  The danger of this is that  the high  degree of selectivity of the 
economy,  the  subduing  of nature’s  wildness  by ascribing  it ecological value  and  the  selling of 
nature  in order to save it (McAfee, 1999) bring too little resonance  into play for the economy  to 
react  to ecological dangers  (Luhmann,  1989,  p.  116). Moreover, all this invokes  are not  actions 
with direct ecological effects (Luhmann, 1989, p. 119), but rather  it produces a socially internally 
felt ‘deep disparity’  (Deleuze, 1990, p. 261). One cannot afford to look too closely, for that  would 
expose the unremarked violence of representation;  or one should stop imagining  the catastrophe, 
for that  would produce ‘catastrophic’  strains and breaks in public and private finance. And there 
the tunnel vision of incentivising  environmental protection  through  the promise of development 
simply reproduces  the paradox  of functional  differentiation,  whereby  it seems that  enabling  the 
dramatic  advance of human  civilisation  comes at the cost of making  it less secure. How then to 
suppress the paradox? 
 
3.6.3 Conceptual dimension 
The conceptual   dimension   refers  here  to  how  the  ILS recruits  the  communitarianism of  an 
‘international community’  so  as to  alleviate  the  negative  consequences  of functional 
differentiation.37  But, since communitarianism cannot  be reduced to any central authority  or 
privileged  position,  its interpretation therefore  demands  a more  procedural  understanding.  We 
may   call t h i s    legitimation   through   procedure   whereby   the   ‘psycho-juridical   requirements’ 
(Teubner, 2006, p. 511) of reciprocal state consent are silently replaced with hidden technical  legal 
exceptions  of good faith, or else the socialisation  of treaties. But then how does one present  the 
tautologies  of the international community in such a way that it provides meaningful  normative 
aspirations, and not just reflect quasi-imperial power arrangements? 
One possibility is the re-entry of external references (namely non-legal communications), which 
is diagnosed as the ‘best known way out’ (Luhmann, 1992, p. 79). By including the excluded – that is, 
by including all that is not communicated through communications – the ILS transcends positive law 
via its  secondary  closure,  via  legal  self-observation.  The  ILS in  other  words  subverts  its  own 
requirements   of  (Eurocentric-rooted)  logic,  such  as  its  complexity-reduction  mechanisms   of 
excluding  the ‘others of international law’  (Orford, 2006) or its complexity-building  mechanisms 
of  institutionalising  the  ‘universal’   so  as  to  maintain   the  structural   biases  of  the  ‘Civilised, 
Advanced,  Developed  or  Rich’  (Eslava and  Pahuja,  2012,  p.  211). And it  does  this  all  for the 
purpose,  as Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos put  it, to see society in  its multiplicity:  to internalise 
‘communications battling against systemic walls, observations  that  never manage to be anything 
more than self-observations, boundaries that shift according to differentiated temporalities’ 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos,  2013b, p. 68): all for the sake of legitimising the law – and nothing 
else. 
Nonetheless, including the excluded can never be done arbitrarily. That would lead to epistemic 
confusion (Teubner, 2001a). The making of exemptions and the non-application of law would, after 
 
 
37   This being not so much the calamity of exploitation and suppression  predominating hierarchical  stratified 
societies, but  rather  it  is  neglect:  ‘The  order  without   which  no  order  would  be  possible  at  all’;  see 
Luhmann  (1997, p. 772).
  
 
 
 
all, in the absence of high structuration, dilute certainty and derange orderly legal processes. Instead, 
inconsistencies must be repressed by deploying the logic of systemic integration: to present the law’s 
inconsistency as consistency so as to make the proof of errors possible and avoid giving impressions 
that general principles of international law have been jettisoned in favour of the concrete interests of 
states and actors. Indeed, norm advancement  can be imposed, but only within  the framework  of 
sovereign constitutions;  treaties can be terminated, but only for particular  reasons of illegality; 
subjective rights can be taken away, but only in the public interest and against compensation. 
Yet, despite the necessity for maintaining symbolisms of normativity, the ILS must also paradoxically 
replace this tradition with a difference that, when observed, always regenerates the unobservable. For the 
law cannot only be identified from texts alone; it must be discussed and argued over; it must be tilted 
ahead and ever searching for adequate connections to operate. Consequently, to prevent the circular 
regression of legal argumentation, the demands for objective responsibility require the re-engineering 
of the law’s procedural  and conceptual  apparatus  – hence its self-simplifying devices, the legal lie of 
fictional legal persons. The inclusion of ecological rights in political constitutions; the gradual 
juridification of animal rights; the change in legal language from the semantics of protection of nature 
via ecological interests to rights of living processes; the slow process of granting standing to ecological 
associations; and the expanding  conceptualisation of ecological damages are just a few indicators  of 
such trends  (Teubner, 2001a, p. 32). But this new criterion of decision-making and its bias towards 
‘presumptive consequences’,  rather  than  time-binding  decisions  (Tarlock,  2004,  p.  220), inevitably 
increases the variety of the ILS, whilst the maintenance of redundancy becomes its problem. Indeed, 
the law’s inadequate sensors of agency, causality and proof of harm requires a focus that paradoxically 
disengages from such ‘juridically potentially problematic  assemblages’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 
2013a, p. 414) so as to acknowledge the difficulty of phronesis (Whiteside, 2006, p. 30), that being the 
problem of a normalising environmental crisis (Barry, 2004), the inadequacy of internal reconstruction 
processes  and  the  interconnectedness  of  an  open  ecology  whereby  ‘everything  is  connected  to 
everything else’ (Commoner, 1971, p. 33). 
This opening of the law to the uncharacterised sphere of the excluded, however, does not mean 
sabotaging the routinised recursivity of legal operations. Rather, it is the very indeterminacy of law 
that becomes the precondition for law’s ability to justify and criticise existing practice (Koskenniemi, 
1989,  p.   614).  In t r a n s f o r m i n g    infinite   into   finite  information   loads,  in  the  translation   
of 
indeterminate complexity into determinate complexity, abstract formal legal argumentation sets 
bounds on acuity. It propagates a culture of formalism that resists power, holds social practice 
accountable a n d  compels claims to be made in a universal  way (Koskenniemi, 2001,  p.  502). In 
short, it imposes  structural  constraints  upon  what  is possible, limiting  the  scale of complexity 
upon  which  conflict systems might  unfold, thereby  lowering the overall extent  of the ungovernability   
within  society.  But, in the  event  that  conflict  systems  exploit  the  constitutive paradoxes  of 
international law (Koskenniemi,  1989) to pursue  their  parochial  interests,  the  ILS finds its last 
resort by resigning itself to externalisation:  it recruits the vocabularies  of risk as its new manager 
of contingency. 
Here, it is the formation of institutionalised production regimes (Teubner, 2001a, p. 34) that takes 
on this task. In functioning as structural  links between autonomous  functional  systems – between 
law, economy, politics, education, research and so forth – production  regimes increasingly cushion 
the law from its fears of abstraction. They produce informal standards that propose aspirations, 
objectives and norms that  do not necessarily derive from functional  possibilities (e.g. the end of 
poverty or environmental sustainability). They facilitate political ‘loose talk’ by expanding 
communication and  irritations38   among  systems,  enhancing   in  turn  societal  awareness  for  a 
 
 
38   Understood here not as annoyance, but rather as an itching calling for action.
  
 
 
 
growing variety of concerns (Peña, 2015, p. 65). And they enable the ILS formal production modes (i.e. 
international customary  law) to do something  unthinkable for a mere  treaty  order: to establish 
binding  norms  even against  the express will of the parties to the treaty,  legitimated  not via the 
state treaties, but via the orientation  of law towards the public interest (Teubner, 2012, p. 50). 
We may call this space of public interests one of fleeting, fragile, almost imaginary consistency 
(Luhmann, 1997) – one that the ILS will have to productively misread, perhaps creatively,39 as a hard- 
core reality if it is to transcend  particular  preferences in the name  of maintaining open political 
discourse. But the fact remains: if one really insists upon exposing inherent tensions and 
contradictions,   then   this   new   drive  for  public   accountability,   ethical   ‘hydrosolidarity’   and 
ecological modernisation that the ILS finds itself along a practical continuum with may not be the 
ideal  structure  for addressing  risks. Yet, in  a particular  way,  it  serves the  purpose  of precisely 
hiding tensions and contradictions  so as to immunise  society from terminal  indecision. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
International law is an evolutionary achievement. It makes no prognosis about when conflicts will 
happen, what the particular  situation  will be, which actors will be involved and how strong their 
involvement   will  be, and  yet  it  provides  ways  of handling  such  future  conflicts.  How is this 
possible? This paper, in employing the field of trans-boundary waters as a special case within 
international  law,  proposes  a  theoretical  framework  for  more  adequately  conceptualising   the 
above phenomenon. It reveals that, despite law’s shift towards equity, whereby justice is now 
fundamentally referred away from itself,40  law’s  achievements  can be found  elsewhere.  They lie 
not  so much i n   its  content,  but  rather  in  its  ability  to  organise  society  in  such  a  way  that 
decisions  may  be  underpinned  by  a  reliance  upon  a  normative   order  –  an  order  that  this 
framework  proposes  to  rediscover  and  reconceptualise  as summarised  here.  Where t h e   law’s 
periphery  occurs, the space where law encounters  all kinds of legal/non-legal interests, the law’s 
autonomous  operations,   the   self-preservation   filter  compensates   for  this.   Where   the   self- 
preservation   filter s e l e c t s  order,   always  prioritising   the   establishment  of  the   ILS’s  eternal 
recursive  autopoiesis,  the  equitable   filter  creates  order  by  determining   the  limits  of  legal 
regulation. Where order is created, the reciprocity filter maintains order by determining the legal 
acceptance of social  behaviour.  And, where order is maintained, the  interdependence  filter continues 
order precisely by accommodating  for simultaneous competition  and coexistence of different 
justifications. 
Of course, what I describe here is simply one type of specific prejudice among other possible types 
of prejudices. In fact, it might even be more accurate to describe the ILS as a purely anarchic system – 
one with tangled hierarchies and ‘strange loops’ where the highest level of a hierarchy ‘loops into’ the 
lowest one (Hofstadter, 1979). All these criticisms, however, miss one key point, for the framework 
does not   assert  a  claim  to  any  objective  technical   truths:  it  should  be  viewed  rather  as  a 
conceptual  tool for bringing about a shift in attention and sensitivity to issues of concern. It is, in 
summary, a question  generating  theoretical  endeavour  that recruits the paradox because: it offers a 
counter-narrative to descriptions  of law that  seek to present  the ILS as one driven by coherent 
consistent normative  propositions; it offers various methodological  recipes for cutting through  the 
rhetoric  of ‘best  practices’  and the  notion  that  all problems  can be solved by more information 
and expertise; and it serves as a reminder  that, if the law simply carries on feeding upon  its own 
sense of superiority, of ‘its importance, history, and its disciplinary identity’ (Blomley, 1994, p. 21), 
 
 
39   See e.g. Lee (2013), who creatively illustrates the potential of integrative rules. 
40   See Koskenniemi (2005, p. 552).
  
 
 
 
it will no longer be able to steer a course between the Scylla of Sisyphean meaninglessness and the 
Charybdis of cynical decisionism. Indeed, this is the agenda: only by successfully describing the ILS as 
an autopoietic self-distinguishing system that strives to make paradoxes invisible is it possible to 
work out the nature to which law develops responsiveness to social interests. 
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